Despite its ambitious mandate to prosecute the world’s most heinous crimes, the International Criminal Court (ICC) remains hamstrung by its inability to enforce its own rulings. Without an independent enforcement mechanism, the Court is forced to rely on state cooperation—cooperation that is often withheld due to political interests, strategic alliances, or outright defiance. This Note examines the structural weaknesses that leave the ICC vulnerable to non-compliance, with a particular focus on the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). While the ASP was envisioned as a crucial pillar of ICC enforcement, its role has been largely performative, issuing non-binding resolutions that do little to compel states to execute arrest warrants or surrender fugitives. This Note argues that the ASP must be reimagined—not as a passive observer but as an active enforcer. To that end, it proposes a set of reforms that would give the ASP meaningful leverage over non-cooperative states, including diplomatic repercussions, financial penalties, possible amendments to the Rome Statute, and stronger engagement with international bodies like the United Nations Security Council. Ultimately, without a fundamental shift in how the ICC navigates state resistance, the promise of global justice will remain just that—a promise, unfulfilled.
