This Note conducts a comprehensive textual analysis of the Voting Rights Act using established principles of statutory interpretation. It argues that the Act expressly provides a private right of action under Section 2 and demonstrates why this interpretation is both textually superior and doctrinally stronger than the available alternatives: implying a private cause of action, relying exclusively on the Department of Justice for enforcement, bringing claims directly under the Reconstruction Amendments, or suing through Section 1983.
The Voting Rights Act is being dismantled, and Section 2 is gradually being hollowed out. Section 2 has long relied on private plaintiffs to bring lawsuits challenging racially discriminatory voting laws and government actions. However, following a suggestion by Justice Gorsuch in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, state and local government defendants have increasingly argued that Section 2 does not provide a private cause of action at all. At least one federal appellate court—the Eighth Circuit in Arkansas State Conference NAACP v. Arkansas Board of Apportionment—has accepted this argument, holding that private plaintiffs lack the right to sue under Section 2.